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INTRODUCTION 
Although Alexander Hamilton famously called the American judi-
cial system the least dangerous branch in Federalist No. 78,1 many legal 
scholars and political scientists in recent years have been troubled by 
the powerful role of the Supreme Court in constitutional interpreta-
tion and the countermajoritarian difficulty.2  Scholars holding this 
view worry that an unelected Court with the power to declare a legis-
lative act or the action of an elected executive unconstitutional sub-
verts the will of the prevailing majority.3  They often share the norma-
tive orientation of classic legal scholars of judicial review.4 
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 1 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 402 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James McClel-
lan, eds., 2001). 
 2 See generally Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part II:  Recon-
struction’s Political Court, 91 GEO. L.J. 1 (2002) (discussing the positive and negative inter-
play between politics and judicial independence, especially during the Reconstruction 
period); Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession:  The History of the Countermajo-
ritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002) (presenting reasons for mid-
twentieth-century academics’ obsession with the countermajoritarian difficulty); Barry 
Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three:  The Lesson of Lochner, 
76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383 (2001) (examining the Lochner era cases to conclude that the test 
for public legitimacy of Supreme Court decisions is whether they are socially legitimate, 
not legally legitimate); Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part 
Four:  Law’s Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 971 (2000) (arguing that the New Deal Court 
changed in response to public opinion pressures, not in response to political pressures 
like the Court-packing plan); Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficul-
ty, Part One:  The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333 (1998) (documenting 
the countermajoritarian difficulty from the Constitution’s beginning to the advent of the 
civil war). 
 3 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:  THE SUPREME COURT AT THE 
BAR OF POLITICS (1962) (defending the practice of judicial review despite its problems); 
see also BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE:  HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS 
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In an important new book, Friedman at once addresses this issue 
and offers a major new positive argument about the Court’s behavior.  
Far from thwarting the popular will, Friedman argues, the Court fre-
quently confirms it.5  This positive argument has an obvious norma-
tive implication:  to the extent that Supreme Court decisions reflect 
public opinion, especially on the most important issues brought be-
fore it, the countermajoritarian difficulty is less problematic. 
This paper casts the countermajoritarian difficulty in a different 
light, drawing on positive political theory to analyze the relationship 
between a deferential Supreme Court with powers of judicial review 
and a constitution’s ability to survive.  Too often, normative studies of 
judicial review and the countermajoritarian difficulty take the consti-
tutional stability of the American system for granted and do not en-
quire about how this stability—unique in the world—arises.  Recent 
empirical work by Elkins et al. reveals that most new constitutions fail; 
in particular, the median democracy lasts only sixteen years.6  This 
means that constitutions that prove durable have special features.  We 
argue that, to be sustained, a democratic constitution must be self-
enforcing in the sense that actors with power to disrupt democracy 
choose not to do so.7 
The central questions of this paper are:  how is American constitu-
tional stability maintained, and how does the Supreme Court contri-
bute to this stability?  To address these questions, we develop a theory 
 
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 258–
62 (2009) [hereinafter FRIEDMAN, WILL OF THE PEOPLE] (documenting the changing 
views regarding judicial review and public opinion). 
 4 See BICKEL, supra note 3; CHRISTIAN G. FRITZ, AMERICAN SOVEREIGNS:  THE PEOPLE AND 
AMERICA’S CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 207–08 (2008) (emphasiz-
ing that the original conception of constitutional interpretation saw the Supreme Court 
as but one of many interpreters, including the people); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE 
THEMSELVES:  POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 7 (2004) [hereinafter 
KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES] (arguing that the original conception of the Constitu-
tion was a democratic one, driven by the people themselves); Larry D. Kramer, Popular 
Constitutionalism, Circa 2004, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 959, 960 (2004) [hereinafter Kramer, Popu-
lar Constitutionalism] (presenting the view of popular constitutionalism and its major ar-
guments against judicial supremacy). 
 5 FRIEDMAN, WILL OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 3, at 4 (describing Friedman's book's purpose 
as “reveal[ing] how the Supreme Court went from being an institution intended to check 
the popular will to one that frequently confirms it”). 
 6 ZACHARY ELKINS ET AL., THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 2 (2009). 
 7 See generally Adam Przeworski, Self-Enforcing Democracy, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 313 (Barry R. Weingast & Donald Wittman eds., 2006) (outlining a 
conception of democracy whereby all actors prefer democracy over another regime); Bar-
ry R. Weingast, The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law, 91 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV.  245–63 (1997) [hereinafter Weingast, Political Foundations] (utilizing game theory to 
argue that all political officials must respect democracy’s limits on their behavior). 
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of the self-enforcing constitution.8  After presenting our theory of 
self-enforcing constitutions, we offer a brief illustration of how our 
framework can be usefully applied to evaluate the role of a “deferen-
tial Court”—one that defers to public opinion—in creating constitu-
tional stability.  We draw attention to the mechanisms through which 
the deferential Court supports or undermines constitutional stability.  
In doing so, we show that our theory of constitutional stability has 
surprising implications for the countermajoritarian difficulty. 
Our approach suggests that the modern Supreme Court, acting 
within the American constitutional framework, often contributes to 
constitutional stability by helping to resolve three fundamental prob-
lems.  The first fundamental problem concerns the rationality of fear.  
When citizens feel threatened by the regime in power, they may sup-
port extra-constitutional action, such as a coup, to protect themselves.  
Too often high-stakes politics lead to coups and constitutional fail-
ures, as in Spain in 1936 or Chile in 1973.  The deferential Court re-
duces the likelihood of extra-constitutional action by lowering the 
stakes of political activity.  The second fundamental problem of con-
stitutional stability concerns the fundamental coordination problem 
underlying democracy, namely, whether citizens have the ability to 
act in concert against political leaders who transgress constitutional 
rules.  By punishing political officials who transgress rights, wide-
spread citizen coordination, in turn, deters political officials who are 
tempted to transgress.  The deferential Court encourages widespread 
coordination against a government that attempts to transgress citizen 
rights by creating new constitutional focal points in its opinions.  The 
third fundamental problem concerns change.  The deferential 
Court’s powerful role in creating constitutional focal points requires 
that it create forms of what North calls “adaptive efficiency”—the ca-
pacity to adjust constitutional interpretation in the face of shocks and 
effectively deal with new circumstances.9 
 
 8 See Sonia Mittal & Barry R. Weingast, Self-Enforcing Constitutions:  With an Application to 
Democratic Stability in America’s First Century 1 (Hoover Inst. & Stanford Univ., Working Pa-
per, 2010) [hereinafter Mittal & Weingast, Self-Enforcing Constitutions], available at 
http://politicalscience.stanford.edu/faculty/weingast/MITTALsecFINAL100724submissi
on4.pdf (developing a theory of the self-enforcing constitution which asks whether politi-
cal officials have the appropriate incentives to honor the Constitution). 
 9 See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 77–78 
(2005) (arguing that America and Western Europe’s adaptive efficiency—the ability to 
maintain efficiency despite outside shocks—is more important than mere economic 
growth); Sonia Mittal, Constitutional Stability in a Changing World:  Institutions, Knowledge, 
and Adaptive Efficiency (Stanford Univ., Working Paper, 2010) [hereinafter Mittal, Constitu-
tional Stability] (on file with author); Mittal & Weingast, Self-Enforcing Constitutions, supra 
note 8, at 12 (“The adaptive efficiency condition addresses the fundamental problem of 
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However, we remain cautious in interpreting the results of this 
preliminary assessment of the deferential Court’s role in supporting 
constitutional stability.  This brief sketch is intended to illustrate the 
range of new questions that emerge by embedding the classic under-
standing of the countermajoritarian difficulty in a positive framework 
explicitly concerned with constitutional stability.  As events of the late 
1860s and the mid-1930s show, Supreme Court justices are not always 
compelled to contribute to a self-enforcing constitution.  When the 
Court has been unwilling or unable to defer to public opinion, the 
public has chosen to retaliate in a variety of ways that have the poten-
tial to threaten constitutional stability at the system-wide level. 
Scholars of judicial review and the countermajoritarian difficulty 
too often take constitutional stability for granted.  Because most new 
constitutions fail, ones that remain stable for extended periods must 
have special properties.  Our study of the self-enforcing constitution 
and the deferential Court suggests that countermajoritarian features 
of a wide variety are often important in creating constitutional stabili-
ty.10  This suggests that the conventional view of countermajoritarian 
difficulty is incomplete, and that a more comprehensive account 
emerges by tracing the mechanisms through which majoritarian and 
non-majoritarian institutions interact to create or undermine consti-
tutional stability. 
With respect to the Supreme Court, we show that the deferential 
Court plays a unique and important role in helping to maintain con-
stitutional stability by lowering stakes, establishing focal points, and 
creating adaptive efficiency.  Moreover, we show that the Court’s role 
in the three mechanisms of constitutional stability has required the 
Court at times to declare a legislative act or the action of an elected 
executive unconstitutional against the will of prevailing majorities.  
Although this action raises the classic question of the countermajori-
tarian difficulty, two reasons suggest that it is not as problematic as 
conventionally thought.  First, as Friedman argues, the Court often 
acts in concert with public opinion.11  Second, the Court’s ability to 
 
change. . . . Successful constitutions are designed to address [possible instability] and en-
able adaptation so as to maintain cooperation as circumstances change.”) 
 10 In fact, part of the reason that the Court is popular is that it protects seemingly nonmajo-
ritarian features of the Constitution.  In particular, it protects structure and process fea-
tures such as the Bill of Rights that are themselves widely popular because they serve to 
lower the stakes for citizens.  These provisions also constrain majorities and their repre-
sentatives, for example, from abridging the rights of minorities. 
 11 See FRIEDMAN, WILL OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 3, at 14–17 (stating that at least one “func-
tion of judicial review in the modern era” is “ultimately to ratify the American people’s 
considered views about the meaning of their Constitution”). 
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preserve constitutional stability at the system-wide level by creating 
focal points requires that it make popular decisions, ones that attract 
widespread support. 
This paper proceeds as follows.  In Part II, we outline our frame-
work for self-enforcing constitutions.  In Part III, we offer a brief ap-
plication of this framework to Friedman’s 2009 history, sketching the 
implications of a deferential Court for constitutional stability.  Con-
clusions and extensions follow. 
PART II:  A THEORY OF SELF-ENFORCING CONSTITUTIONS 
Why have some countries sustained stable democratic constitu-
tions for decades while others have failed?12  Political scientists have 
persuasively argued that democratic stability requires that political 
leaders observe a few simple rules that limit their behavior.13  Incum-
bent officials who lose elections must step down; and those out of 
power must be willing to refrain from using force as a means of tak-
ing control of government.  Further, democratic stability requires 
that officials have incentives to honor the democratic rules; that is, 
that democracy is self-enforcing. 
Mittal and Weingast argue that democratic political stability, par-
ticularly during “Przeworski moments” of transition,14 requires that 
citizens and the government have incentives to abide by the rules 
embodied in a constitution.15  Three fundamental problems impede 
constitutional stability.  Paralleling each problem is a condition that 
explains how the problem can be solved or mitigated. 
The first fundamental problem concerns the rationality of fear.16  
When citizens feel threatened by the regime in power, they may sup-
port extra-constitutional action, such as a coup, to protect themselves.  
Self-enforcing constitutions mitigate this problem through the limit 
 
 12 The framework in this Part draws on our more extensive treatment of these ideas.  See 
generally Mittal & Weingast, Self-Enforcing Constitutions, supra note 8. 
 13 Weingast, Political Foundations, supra note 7, at 245–63. 
 14 See generally ADAM PRZEWORSKI, DEMOCRACY AND THE MARKET 37 (1991) (examining the 
strategic situations that arise when a dictatorship collapses to conclude that a democracy 
is only one among many possible outcomes). 
 15 See Mittal & Weingast, Self-Enforcing Constitutions, supra note 8, at 6–7 (stating that “all ac-
tors must find it in their interests to adhere to the constitutional rules and as circums-
tances change, they must be able to adapt policies and institutions to maintain that stabil-
ity over time”). 
 16 See generally Rui J.P. de Figueiredo, Jr. & Barry R. Weingast, The Rationality of Fear:  Political 
Opportunism and Ethnic Conflict, in CIVIL WARS, INSECURITY, AND INTERVENTION 261, 266–
67 (Barbara F. Walter & Jack Snyder eds., 1999) (arguing that the fear of extreme conse-
quences, such as being a victim, can lead citizens to active violence). 
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condition, the idea that the constitution must reduce the stakes of pol-
itics.  When people have less to lose, they are less likely to support ex-
tra-constitutional action.  For the limit condition to hold, the consti-
tution must protect what those with the power to disrupt democracy 
hold most dear. 
The second problem of constitutional stability concerns the fun-
damental coordination problem underlying democracy.  When citi-
zens have the ability to act in concert against transgressions by those 
in power, they can punish officials for transgressing by withdrawing 
support and forcing incumbents out.  In the face of this punishment, 
incumbents will forgo transgressions.17  For this mechanism to work, 
citizens must have the ability to act in concert against political leaders 
who transgress constitutional rules.  But coordination is hardly as-
sured.  The diversity of interests among the citizenry means that citi-
zens typically disagree about fundamental rights, the appropriate 
procedures of government, and the content of legislation.  These dis-
agreements make decentralized or spontaneous coordination nearly 
impossible. 
The consensus condition suggests that self-enforcing constitutions 
encourage widespread coordination by creating focal points that 
guide citizen coordination in the face of constitutional violations.  
Constitutional focal points involve provisions concerning the process 
of government, such as the production of sovereign commands, and 
about citizen rights, such as property rights or the right to free as-
sembly.  To serve this function, focal points must lead to outcomes 
widely perceived as beneficial.18  Absent this condition, citizens are 
hardly likely to act to preserve the constitution. 
Overall, we know too little about how such focal points are 
created.  Often they are produced in times of crisis through pacts 
among contending elites.  Indeed, Elster suggests that many durable 
constitutions were created in times of crisis.19 
 
 17 Weingast, Political Foundations, supra note 7, at 245–63. 
 18 Id. at 245–63. 
 19 Elster writes: 
The occasions for constitution-making include social and economic crisis, as in the 
making of the American constitution of 1787 or the French constitution of 1791; 
revolution, as in the making of the French and German 1848 constitutions; regime 
collapse, as in the making of the most recent constitutions in Southern Europe 
and in Eastern Europe; fear of regime collapse, as in the making of the French 
constitution of 1958, which was imposed by de Gaulle under the shadow of a mili-
tary rebellion; defeat in war, as in Germany after the First or Second World War, 
or in Italy and Japan after the Second; reconstruction after the war, as in France in 
1946; creation of a new state, as in Poland and Czechoslovakia after the First 
World War; and liberation from colonial rule, as in the American states after 1776 
and in many third world countries after 1945. 
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The third fundamental problem concerns change.  Economies 
boom and bust; technological innovations alter the way citizens inte-
ract; and a wide variety of circumstances change the relative power 
and distribution of relevant groups in society.  More formally, North 
describes our environment as non-ergodic—a world of regular, if epi-
sodic, change.20  Non-ergodic change means that nations regularly 
face new problems and crises where solutions are not obvious.  These 
changes require that humans must constantly create new and up-
dated theories to comprehend their environment and then use these 
theories to help address new problems. 
The ubiquity and unpredictability of change complicates the first 
two fundamental principles of constitutional stability.  Institutions de-
signed to lower stakes or enable widespread coordination typically 
create static or short-term stability.  Changes in the environment may 
alter the payoffs to cooperative activity and therefore render such in-
stitutions unstable. 
Dynamic or long-term constitutional stability requires adaptation 
to new circumstances in ways that maintain the limit and consensus 
conditions over time.  The adaptive efficiency condition addresses the 
fundamental problem of change.  Adaptive efficiency refers to the 
capacity to adjust in the face of shocks and to restructure institutions 
within the constitutional framework that effectively deal with an al-
tered reality.21 
Adaptive efficiency is often created through the lawmaking 
process.  Lawmaking is traditionally associated with legislatures—
assemblies with the power to create and amend law—but usually in-
volves other constituent executive and judicial institutions.  When 
states encounter changes that threaten political stability, laws are 
made to restore cooperative activity in the new state of the world.  
From the perspective of constitutional stability, lawmaking is the 
state’s primary means of adaptation. 
The three conditions of constitutional stability are complementa-
ry.  The limit condition holds that credible limits on the state inhibit 
resorts to extra-constitutional measures, rendering constitutions 
more likely to survive.  The consensus condition identifies the me-
chanisms under which these limits are credible—i.e. when citizens 
have solved the coordination problem and can take action against of-
 
  JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND:  STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND 
CONSTRAINTS 159 (2000). 
 20 NORTH, supra note 9, at 19–20. 
 21 Id.; see also Mittal, Constitutional Stability, supra note 9, at 12; Mittal & Weingast, Self-
Enforcing Constitutions, supra note 8, at 4. 
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ficials who violate these limits.  The adaptive efficiency condition ex-
plores how the first two principles are preserved over time and in 
changing circumstances.  While the first two principles create static 
stability, stability over time requires adaptive efficiency. 
PART III:  APPLICATION 
As Friedman argues, the classic concern raised by the counterma-
joritarian difficulty—that judicial review interferes with the will of the 
people—is radically overstated.22  He argues instead that the persis-
tent question throughout history has been whether, and to what ex-
tent, should the Supreme Court exercise the power of judicial review.  
A complete answer to this question must begin with an analysis of the 
implications of judicial review for outcomes of interest. 
Our analysis begins with the problem of constitutional stability.  
Many Framers of the Federal Constitution of 1787 were concerned, if 
not obsessed, with creating lasting political and constitutional stabili-
ty.  Madison, for his part, placed all hope of “furthering justice and 
the public good” on the foundation of preserving political order.23  
Deeply disturbed by the chronic instability plaguing government un-
der the Articles of Confederation, leading Federalists sought to create 
a republic that would endure.24  In confronting the manifest deficien-
cies of the Articles, our earliest leaders boldly confronted the chal-
lenges inherent in maintaining political stability in an uncertain and 
rapidly changing world.  Since the Founding, preserving the Union 
has been of continuing interest to each new generation of Ameri-
cans—and stability continues to be a central, if under-conceptualized, 
concern in today’s debates on the Court’s ongoing role in constitu-
tional interpretation. 
How does the development of a Court with strong powers of judi-
cial review contribute to or threaten constitutional stability?  Fried-
man persuasively argues that the Court defers to the people far more 
often than it challenges them.  This basic empirical finding can be 
analyzed formally in a standard deterrence framework.  Credible 
threats of punishment (e.g. jurisdiction-stripping, court-packing, or 
 
 22 FRIEDMAN, WILL OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 3, at 9 (stating that “[c]aught up in imme-
diate controversy, Americans . . . fail to see that what looks to be a roaring battle over 
judicial power is simply the latest round in a much broader struggle over the proper in-
terpretation of the Constitution,” and that “the history of the relationship between judi-
cial review and the popular will has been one of great continuity”). 
 23 DREW R. MCCOY, THE LAST OF THE FATHERS:  JAMES MADISON AND THE REPUBLICAN 
LEGACY 44 (1989). 
 24 Mittal, Constitutional Stability, supra note 9, at 15. 
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worse, ignoring the court through non-compliance) successfully de-
ter the Court from straying far from public opinion. 
In this framework, successful popular deterrence of the Court 
contributes to constitutional stability by inducing opinions that are 
far less likely to provoke serious challenges from the public.  Our 
framework for self-enforcing constitutions helps explain why this me-
chanism works by embedding the deferential Court in a broader 
theory of constitutional stability.  Paralleling the three conditions in 
our framework discussed in Part II, we show that a deferential Court 
with strong powers of judicial review contributes to constitutional sta-
bility in at least three ways. 
Per the first problem of constitutional stability, a Court that fears 
punishment is less likely to permit the passage of widely unpopular 
and potentially destabilizing legislation or, more broadly, govern-
ment actions.  This induced behavioral feature of the Court helps 
preserve the limit condition; it reliably serves to lower the stakes in 
politics for ordinary citizens.  Indeed, Friedman shows that many of 
the most controversial decisions issued by the Court have been desta-
bilizing precisely because they unexpectedly and significantly raised 
the stakes for large groups of citizens.25  For instance, the Supreme 
Court’s 1819 decision in McCulloch v. Maryland involved an expansive 
interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause.26  Because it po-
tentially allowed a much broader range of national government pow-
ers, this decision “fully raised the states’ rights bear from its slumb-
er.”27  The opinion seriously threatened several states—leading some 
down the path of noncompliance and eventually nullification. 
The importance of lowering the stakes of political activity raises 
the important question of what “the will of the people” is and how it 
can be measured.  What does it mean for the Court to be deferential 
to public opinion?  To whose opinion should it defer?  Friedman’s 
richly researched history is broadly concerned with capturing “the 
evolving views of the American public”—by which he often means the 
 
 25 See generally FRIEDMAN, WILL OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 3, at 9 (arguing that many of the 
most controversial Court decisions were destabilizing precisely because they dramatically 
affected large groups of citizens). 
 26 See generally McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (holding that the Ne-
cessary and Proper Clause permits Congress to pursue any objective rationally related to 
an enumerated power so long as it is not expressly prohibited by the Constitution). 
 27 FRIEDMAN, WILL OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 3, at 82; see also Jack N. Rakove, Judicial Power 
in the Constitutional Theory of James Madison, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1513, 1514 (2002) (ar-
guing that James Madison was concerned with the Court’s decision in McCulloch because 
of the potential damage it could cause to a republican system of government). 
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view of the “majority” or the people at large.28  In doing so, he con-
fronts the challenging methodological problems inherent in recon-
structing the “collage of ever-shifting views” of public opinion.29  By 
necessity, he often relies on journalistic sources such as newspaper 
and magazine articles for measures of public opinion.  Sometimes 
these sources report the results of surveys and polls, and at other 
times they reflect the journalist’s subjective impression of the state of 
public opinion. 
Dorf offers a more specific conception of public opinion empha-
sizing the importance of the median.30  “Although courts do regularly 
invalidate state and federal action on constitutional grounds, they 
rarely depart substantially from the median of public opinion.”31 
Neither Friedman nor Dorf justifies their conceptions of public 
opinion theoretically.  Why is it that the opinion of the “majority” or 
the “median” is so important?  Our positive political theory frame-
work provides an answer.  Part of the means of success for the defe-
rential Court is that, as circumstances evolve, it adapts the constitu-
tional bargain not in an arbitrary or personal way, but in a way that 
continues to resolve the three constitutional problems noted above.  
But how exactly does the Court do so? 
Standard spatial modeling techniques and positive political theo-
ries of political competition provide basic insight into this problem.  
Assuming that citizen preferences are single-peaked and normally 
distributed in a uni-dimensional issue space, the Court satisfies the 
most people (thereby lowering stakes as much as possible) by ruling 
consistent with the mean (or equivalently the median) of public opi-
nion.  Given these standard assumptions, the farther the Court moves 
from the center of public opinion, the less the Court satisfies the 
people.  Our framework and this simple model explain why the cen-
ter of public opinion is so important to Friedman’s history and sug-
gests how the Court can optimally lower stakes given lumpy or asym-
metric distributions of citizens’ preferences.  Pursuing median-
favored policies maximizes overall support for the Supreme Court’s 
opinions. 
Per the second fundamental problem, over the course of Ameri-
ca’s history many opinions of the Supreme Court have come to serve 
 
 28 FRIEDMAN, WILL OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 3, at 17–18. 
 29 Id. at 17. 
 30 See Michael Dorf, Interpretive and Institutional Responses to the Majoritarian Difficulty (Cornell 
Law Sch., Working Paper, 2010), available at http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2010/01/
judiciary-and-popular-will.html. 
 31 See id. at 1. 
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as focal points for widespread coordination.  The ability to coordinate 
against the government through the creation of focal points provides 
a powerful deterrent to destabilizing constitutional transgressions.  
Because citizen coordination to withdraw their support from a leader 
following a constitutional violation threatens the leader’s political fu-
ture, leaders have strong incentives to adhere to the rules.  Concomi-
tantly, leaders are more likely to pursue transgressions when they be-
lieve they will retain sufficient support to remain in power. 
Acting to preserve and adapt focal points allows the deferential 
Court to enhance the public’s ability to coordinate against the gov-
ernment by creating shared signals on just what actions constitute a 
transgression, the rights of citizens, and appropriate public policies.  
Absent these signals, differences in citizens’ experience, interests, 
and values often lead to coordination failure.  Moreover, the Court’s 
position in the American constitutional framework enhances the clar-
ity of its signals because it is the sole source of binding opinion, and 
those opinions are supreme and authoritative for the entire judiciary.  
The opinions of a Court deferential to the people are more likely to 
be regarded as focal because citizens are more likely to value the opi-
nion and to believe that others will act in accordance with it. 
The institutional significance of the evolving constitutional bar-
gain between the Court and the people that Friedman’s history de-
scribes is this:  by deferring to the people, the Court was gradually 
conferred—or, perhaps, was gradually able to assume—the power to 
serve as an unambiguous creator of constitutional focal points.  This 
power gives the Court a central position in creating and maintaining 
constitutional stability.  Friedman argues that in the early 1800s a ta-
cit deal emerged between Federalists and Republicans “that set the 
judiciary on the course to the authority it maintains today.”32  Federal-
ist judges acknowledged the importance of refraining from blatant 
partisanship on the bench and the Republicans, for their part, al-
lowed the judiciary limited independence.33 
As a result, Friedman’s narrative of the growth of the Court’s in-
dependence and powers of judicial review can be usefully reframed as 
the story of the development of the Court’s institutional capacity to 
create focal points for widespread coordination.  Our emphasis on 
the Court’s role as creator of focal points offers a theoretically driven 
approach to concerns often raised by the legal literature on the 
 
 32 FRIEDMAN, WILL OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 3, at 45. 
 33 Id. at 44–71. 
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Court’s “settlement power.”34  Usually, the ability to create constitu-
tional focal points implies not only the power of judicial review but 
also some level of discretion to determine what the Constitution 
means.  The contemporary Court’s role in settling constitutional 
meaning is not usually thought of as being constrained to a single 
choice by various forms of partisan and institutional gridlock.  Ra-
ther, the contemporary Court has gained some measure of indepen-
dence—allowing it to choose constitutional focal points from a range 
of possibilities.  That latitude and the range of possible constitutional 
focal points are shaped by the people and their willingness to defer to 
the Court’s choice.35 
Bush v. Gore serves as a useful illustration used by Friedman to 
highlight the deferential Court’s definitive status as the primary 
chooser of constitutional focal points.36  In this decision, the Court 
intervened in the outcome of a close presidential election.  Although 
Friedman writes that many were troubled by the Court’s intervention, 
the people quickly deferred to the Court’s decision.37  In fact, Fried-
man reports that within a year of the decision the Court returned to 
high levels of bipartisan support.38 
Per problem three, a deferential Court also creates adaptive effi-
ciency by creating focal points for coordination as the state faces new 
and unanticipated circumstances and constitutional issues.  Moreo-
ver, this behavioral feature of the Court is enhanced to the extent 
that, per Friedman, the Court supports effective adaptation by en-
trenching new constitutional norms after public opinion has matured 
and crystallized. 
In a rapidly changing world, the state regularly encounters new 
problems with which the government and public have little expe-
rience.  These situations are potentially problematic for constitution-
al stability because more than one constitutional interpretation exists 
and people typically disagree about which is most appropriate. 
 
 34 Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 4, at 962 (arguing that controversies would 
never end if the Court did not have the final say on a given matter). 
 35 See FRIEDMAN, WILL OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 3, at 31; see also KRAMER, THE PEOPLE 
THEMSELVES, supra note 4, at 65–68. 
 36 See generally Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (making a federal constitutional matter out 
of a seemingly state-based issue regarding the state of Florida’s vote re-counting process). 
 37 See FRIEDMAN, WILL OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 3, at 358, 379 (noting how quickly even 
Democrats had high levels of confidence in the Court, despite Court’s decision in Bush).  
See generally id. at 323–66 (noting that today, the people tend to acquiesce to Supreme 
Court decisions quickly). 
 38 See id. at 15 (noting that the negative public sentiment associated with the Court’s deci-
sion in Bush dissipated quickly). 
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In these situations public opinion matures and crystallizes over 
time and with intervening events.  A Court deferential to public opi-
nion contributes to constitutional stability by adapting old or estab-
lishing new constitutional focal points that privilege the “considered 
judgment” of the American people over their “passing fancy.”39  As 
Friedman suggests, Court rulings both catalyze and entrench public 
discussion of important issues.  Through the iterative process of judi-
cial decision—popular response—judicial re-decision, the Court 
prompts the public to debate issues of fundamental interest and to 
find solutions and compromises that “obtain broad and lasting sup-
port.”40  “This, then, is the function of judicial review in the modern 
era:  to serve as a catalyst, to force public debate, and ultimately to ra-
tify the American people’s considered views about the meaning of 
their Constitution.”41 
The Court’s central position as chooser of constitutional focal 
points and the ever-present possibility of popular retaliation give the 
Court considerable incentives both to distinguish the passing fancy of 
the people from their considered judgment and, ultimately, to craft 
opinions that implement the latter.  Entrenching constitutional focal 
points in deference to the “passions” of the people has led to consi-
derable instability as opinions changed.  Friedman suggests that per-
ceived switches by the Court with respect to the Wagner Act, Com-
munist activities, and death penalty cases seemed to reflect a desire to 
ultimately ratify only the considered opinion of the people.42 
PART IV:  CONCLUSIONS 
As practiced by the deferential Court, judicial review contributes 
to constitutional stability in an important way by lowering stakes in 
politics, establishing new constitutional focal points, and creating 
adaptive efficiency. 
Our application of the self-enforcing constitutions framework to 
the problem of judicial review suggests a new understanding of the 
countermajoritarian difficulty and the Court’s ultimate role in a con-
stitutional democracy.  The classic legal debate of the Court’s role, 
whether the Court follows public opinion or exercises various forms 
 
 39 Id. at 16. 
 40 Id. at 16, 381 (arguing that the most important role that judicial review serves is to foster 
public debate about important issues). 
 41 Id. 
 42 See id. at 232, 254–55, 285–86 (explaining these cases and identifying examples of in-
stances where the Court seemingly bowed to public opinion despite strong legal argu-
ments to the contrary). 
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of independence qua the countermajoritarian difficulty, is too nar-
row.  Our framework suggests that the Court simultaneously follows 
public opinion and exercises independence. 
The deferential Court leads the people in supporting constitu-
tional stability by solving new coordination problems as they appear, 
for example, in circumstances unanticipated by the Founders or 
when circumstances reveal new ambiguities in the text.  It leads by 
choosing focal points out of an array of possibilities in new situations 
(and especially crises) or extends existing focal points when new cir-
cumstances or unexpected contingencies arise. 
But the deferential Court’s choice of focal points is constrained by 
the public and what it values.  Unpopular decisions fail to serve the 
purpose of creating new focal points.  Recall our interpretation of 
Friedman’s argument—by deferring to the people, the Court was 
gradually conferred the power to serve as a central creator of consti-
tutional focal points.  Because the Court requires public support to 
assure its independence from elected officials, justices must temper 
reliance on their own ideological views so as to reflect the views of the 
public.  In this view, a deferential Court catalyzes debate and solidi-
fies public opinion, rather than creating more divisive debate. 
However, this analysis should not lead to unqualified optimism 
about the overall implications of the deferential Court for constitu-
tional stability.  The history of popular deterrence of the Supreme 
Court has not been without controversy and judicial review has not 
always been self-enforcing—as events of the 1860s and 1930s clearly 
show.  When the Court has been unwilling or unable to defer to pub-
lic opinion, the public and their elected representatives have chosen to 
retaliate in a variety of ways that have had the potential to seriously 
threaten constitutional stability at the system-wide level.  Friedman 
writes, “Americans have abolished courts, impeached one justice, 
regularly defied Court orders, packed the Court, and stripped its ju-
risdiction.”43 
Given that the Court has become a central source of focal points 
that foster widespread coordination, its institutional capacity to retain 
this power by deferring to the public becomes all the more important 
for overall constitutional stability.44  Popular punishment can serious-
ly threaten the Court’s role in preserving constitutional stability.  Ju-
risdiction-stripping has the potential to remove the Court’s ability to 
create focal points on precisely those issues that require widespread 
 
 43 Id. at 375. 
 44 Mittal, Constitutional Stability, supra note 9, at 90. 
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coordination in the future.  For its part, court-packing can under-
mine the legitimacy of the Court in ways that can unexpectedly raise 
stakes for citizens and undermine the focal potential of rulings. 
Indeed, the threat of popular retaliation has at times induced the 
Court to adopt institutional procedures with mixed implications for 
constitutional stability.  The mechanisms that Friedman argues the 
Court uses to self-correct and lower stakes in the face of threats (for 
instance, ruling on an issue in a series of opinions or using indeter-
minate language) can undermine the clarity and focal potential of 
opinions.  Moreover, potential conflict with the political branches has 
led the Court to voluntarily adopt limitations on jurisdiction and jus-
ticiability,45 thereby depriving the system of its institutional expertise 
and focal potential in a variety of areas. 
So far the Court has yet to be punished in a way that has seriously 
undermined its role as a co-equal branch of government and the sta-
bility of the constitutional system as a whole.  But as Friedman re-
minds us, “[i]f the preceding history shows anything, it is that when 
judicial decisions wander far from what the public will tolerate, bad 
things happen to the Court and the justices.”46 
Once we recognize that constitutional stability cannot be taken for 
granted, the countermajoritarian difficulty and the Court’s ultimate 
role in a constitutional democracy appear differently than cast in the 
literature.  Classic works on the countermajoritarian difficulty ques-
tion the role of a Court that invalidates actions of elected officials 
(e.g., Bickel).  Friedman addresses this point in part by observing the 
critical importance of the Court’s deference to understanding the 
countermajoritarian difficulty.  Nonetheless, Friedman’s framing of 
the countermajoritarian debate, whether the Court follows public 
opinion or exercises various forms of independence, remains too 
narrow.  Our framework suggests that the Court simultaneously fol-
lows public opinion and exercises independence, and that in doing 
so, it contributes to constitutional stability. 
Put another way, the problem of maintaining constitutional stabil-
ity has come to suggest an important role for the Court that does not 
involve its complete deference to public opinion.  As a society, we 
therefore face a tradeoff:  a Court that is not fully deferential has 
greater ability to adjust focal points under changing circumstances; 
 
 45 See John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary:  Institutio-
nalizing Judicial Restraint 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1001 (2002) (noting that the Court has 
adopted limits on its own jurisdiction in order to avoid potential conflict with other 
branches of government). 
 46 FRIEDMAN, WILL OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 3, at 375. 
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but to do so, it must at times invalidate the actions of elected officials 
against the will of the prevailing majority.  On the other hand, great-
er deference necessarily implies less flexibility to adjust focal points.  
To the extent that the Court acts on the recommendations of those 
fearing the countermajoritarian difficulty—that is, it becomes more 
deferential to elected officials—it weakens its ability in its current role 
to maintain and adapt the Constitution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
